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 Computers and the Constitution:
 A Helpful, Harmful or
 Harmless Relationship?
 Kenneth L. Kraemer, University of California, Irvine
 John Leslie King, University of California, Irvine
 Early in 1986, while discussing the lawsuit challenging
 the constitutionality of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
 deficit reduction law, Congressman Michael Synar,
 primary sponsor of the suit, said he was compelled to
 challenge the law because he believed Congress may not
 delegate its constitutional responsibility to a computer.
 With the enactment of general revenue sharing in 1972,
 and with each successive renewal of aid over the follow-
 ing decade, critics decried the "politics by printout"
 arising from district-by-district computer printouts
 showing aid distribution based on complex formulas.
 And with the enactment of the Deficit Reduction Act of
 1984, scholars argue that Congress has, in effect,
 reversed the 1974 Privacy Act by requiring all states to
 participate in file merging, matching, and linking pro-
 grams to verify the eligibility of beneficiaries of social
 welfare programs.' Despite such concerns, the tendency
 towards computerization continues unabated with fed-
 eral agency budgets for information technology reach-
 ing $15.2 billion in fiscal year 1986, and forecast to
 reach $23.8 billion by 1988.121
 Computers have taken on a highly visible role as tools
 of government and as symbols in the ongoing debate
 about how government ought to function. Far to one
 side in this debate, computers form part of a demonic
 vision; an Orwellian nightmare in which autocrats
 eliminate democratic government and individual
 freedom through computerized surveillance. This view
 has been prominent over the years, beginning in 1964
 with Vance Packard's popular book, The Naked
 Society, and it remains a strong theme in both popular
 literature and scholarly works such as Kenneth
 Laudon's recent book, Dossier Society. 3 Far at the other
 side of the debate, computers form part of a beatific
 vision of efficient, effective, and truly democratic
 government. While seldom articulated in a single place,
 this vision is incumbent in works that laud the com-
 puter's role in eliminating waste, fraud, and abuse;
 streamlining the functions of government; and permit-
 ting electronic voting and plebiscites.4 These end points
 embrace a spectrum of widely divergent views about the
 role of computers in democratic government and raise
 the basic question of whether computers and com-
 puterization are altering or will alter the functioning of
 American constitutional government. A less common
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 * The growing use of computers by government agen-
 cies at all levels of the U.S. federal system raises fun-
 damental questions of significance for the Constitution.
 Chief among these are whether computing will upset the
 delicate balances struck by the Constitution among the
 branches of government in the separation of powers
 doctrine, among the levels of government in federalism,
 between government and the people in the Amend-
 ments, and between various factions in the political
 system in the electoral process. These balances, which
 are under assault daily from computerization, currently
 tend to be affected primarily at the margins, as when
 computerization provides temporary advantage or
 disadvantage to one branch, level, or agency of govern-
 ment, or to one political faction over another. While
 computerization is not presently a fundamental threat
 to constitutional arrangements, it could be-especially
 with regard to personal privacy and political elections
 and, to a lesser extent, with regard to the separation of
 powers and federalism. Vigilance in the form of aware,
 informed leaders buttressed with systematic, empirical
 research on the interrelations of computers and the con-
 stitution could provide a powerful counterbalance to
 threats that stem from the growing computerization of
 government and the society.
 perspective that is orthogonal to these two, which raises
 equally serious questions, is Huxley's Brave New World
 view of technology as a seductive force leading to com-
 placence in which liberty and freedom are given up to a
 benign and helpful social order facilitated by the
 technology.
 As part of this special 200th anniversary observance
 of the American Constitution, this paper assesses the
 implications of computers within the constitutionally-
 defined structure, processes, and function of govern-
 ment in the United States. This topic is especially in-
 teresting because the original Framers of the Constitu-
 tion could not have foreseen the introduction and
 massive deployment of computer technology, so they
 established no precedent to guide the use and influence
 of such technologies within the governmental system.
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 Making Sense of the Terms
 Computers, in this article, refer to substantially more
 than the basic machines associated with computing.
 Computer technology is a "package" which encom-
 passes a complex, interdependent system comprised of
 people (computer specialists, users, managers), equip-
 ment (hardware such as computer mainframes,
 peripherals, and telecommunications gear; software
 such as operating systems and application programs;
 and data), and technique (management science models,
 procedures, organizational arrangements). As suggested
 above, we include the expanding functional intersection
 of computing and communications technologies in our
 definition because computers and telecommunications
 are increasingly intertwined in the everyday functioning
 of computer-based systems at all levels of government.
 Other information technologies, especially mass com-
 munication technologies such as radio, television, and
 print, have implications for democratic government,
 but we do not include them in this analysis. We focus on
 computers and those key information technologies
 which tend to be closely linked with computers-name-
 ly, telecommunications and management science models
 for decision making.
 No lasting power shifts will occur among
 the branches of government as a result of
 computers. However, temporary shifts in
 the balance of power could occur.
 The Constitution refers to the documents and the
 ongoing mechanisms of constitutional government that
 maintain the operations of the U.S. federal system. The
 most important of these are the original Constitution,
 its Amendments, and the landmark constitutional inter-
 pretations of the Supreme Court.5 Three structural
 features of the Constitution are especially relevant to
 computers: (1) it establishes the three branches of the
 federal government and specifies their duties and con-
 straints (the separation of powers doctrine); (2) it
 defines the functions which the federal government
 must perform, can perform, and cannot perform,
 thereby leaving the rest of the states and the people
 (federalism); and it (3) specifies relations between the
 government and the people, mainly the First, Fourth,
 Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
 Interrelation of Computers and the Constitution
 In a broad sense, the issue of computers and the Con-
 stitution involves the sensitivity of the federal system, as
 established in form and function by the Constitution, to
 technological change. Four major nexes of the federal
 system are generally considered to be particularly
 susceptible to disruption via technological change:
 1. Interactions between the relative power among the
 branches of the federal government - legislative, ex-
 ecutive, judicial - in the context of their perfor-
 mance of their constitutional duties and the role they
 play in governmental affairs. One of the fundamen-
 tal principles of the Constitution is to check the cen-
 tral power of the national government by dividing it
 into three essentially equal, independent, and
 sometimes competing branches. However, the dif-
 ferential rate of computerization among the three
 branches has the potential to undermine the constitu-
 tional checks and balances by providing substantive,
 procedural, functional, or symbolic advantage to one
 or more branches.6
 2. Interactions between and relative power among the
 national government and other governments in the
 federated governmental system. The construction of
 national information systems such as those in
 criminal justice and the growing linkage of federal-
 state-local information systems such as employment,
 tax, and welfare systems is viewed by some as in-
 creasing the power of the national government and
 nationalizing, or at least delocalizing, state and local
 policy and programs.7
 3. Interactions and relative power distribution between
 "government" and the "people," both individuals
 and groups. The increased sharing of computer-
 based information on individuals and groups within
 the society by all branches of government is viewed as
 having the potential to subtly and pervasively under-
 mine individual freedoms.8
 4. Functions of the political processes that result in the
 election and appointment of officeholders under the
 structure provided by the Constitution. The ex-
 ploding use of computer technology in political ac-
 tivity, including political party management, fund
 raising, public opinion monitoring, and direct-mail
 campaigning, has the potential to change the balance
 of power among various factions in the political
 system even if it does not change the constitutional
 structure of the government system.9
 Computers and Federal Interbranch Relations
 Ever since the introduction of computers in the na-
 tional government, the public press has been rife with
 speculation that power shifts would result from who has
 more computers, more information, more analytic
 capacity, and/or more technical staff. In general, it has
 been argued that the executive branch would gain ad-
 vantages over the legislative and judicial branches
 because of its relatively greater computerization. A re-
 cent example of this kind of speculation is provided by
 an article that appeared in the Washington Post by
 Michael Schrage entitled, "How you can profit from
 the coming federal InfoWar." 10 Schrage's article con-
 sisted of a lengthy list of winners and losers from the ad-
 vent of computers, particularly microcomputers. Win-
 ners ". . . bask in the advantages that clever exploita-
 tion of information technology can provide." Losers
 '-'... may be doomed to an impotent existence of
 technological obsolescence." The idea underlying all
 these speculations is that "the agency with the most
 computer and information firepower wins. " More
 broadly, this idea lies at the heart of arguments that
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 computers and information systems provide strategic or
 competitive advantage. I I While thought provoking,
 these kinds of analysis suffer from serious weaknesses
 when viewed in terms of the constitutional separation of
 powers among the branches of government.
 The essence of the separation of powers doctrine is
 that each branch has separate functions, each is con-
 stitutionally and politically independent of the other,
 and each has inviolate recourse through which to check
 the others. Information technology does not and cannot
 fundamentally change these constitutional relation-
 ships, although it might occasionally tip the balance at
 the margins. Three examples serves to illustrate:
 Example 1. The executive branch gains advantage
 over the legislative branch as a result of computerized
 information systems. It is most frequently asserted that
 the executive branch gains power over the legislative
 branch as a result of the executive's greater com-
 puterization. 12 The actual exploitation of computer-
 based information requires highly sophisticated soft-
 ware and people, easy access to the information, and
 powerful computers for processing the information.
 Such capability is most likely to reside in the executive
 branch because of its size, greater experience with com-
 puting, and relatively monolithic bureaucracy. Conse-
 quently, the executive branch would gain in power over
 the smaller, less experienced, and diffuse bureaucracies
 supporting the legislative branch. The power gain sup-
 posedly stems from the greater computing, information,
 and analytic capabilities available to the executive
 branch that allow the President to better defend ad-
 ministration policies and better control the bureaucracy,
 while at the same time withholding information from
 Congress and thereby weakening its influence with the
 bureaucracy.
 Even if such power gains were to occur, the
 executive's advantage would be temporary because
 Congress has several responses available to it. First,
 Congress can limit and control executive branch com-
 puterization. It can stop executive purchase of new com-
 puter systems by legislation; it can "order" the ex-
 ecutive branch to jump through many procurement
 hoops on equipment, software, and staff; and it can
 delay acquisitions by directing the General Accounting
 Office to look into questions of faulty procurement,
 cost overruns, mismanagement, and threats to privacy
 resulting from executive computerization.
 Second, Congress can enhance its access to executive
 branch information by linking terminals to executive
 agency databases. Few in the executive branch want this
 because it potentially gives away too much of the ex-
 ecutive branch's power to Congress. From a constitu-
 tional standpoint, one would say this potentially impairs
 the "independence" of the executive branch. However,
 Congress can always request data from executive agen-
 cies under the Freedom of Information Act; and agen-
 cies are usually only too willing to provide data in ex-
 change for favorable treatment of their appropriations.
 Congress can also gain direct access to computer
 databases of the executive branch where they share
 functions as in the budgetary process. Though the
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 executive branch i itially re is ed on the grounds of
 executive privilege, it now regularly shares its computer-
 ized budget plans with Congress in the interest of timely
 congressional review and completion of the budgetary
 process. 13
 Third, Congress can increase its independence from
 executive information, expertise, and analyses by buy-
 ing its own computers, developing its own information
 systems, and operating its own analytic models with its
 own staff. In this way, Congress can achieve parity
 with, as well as independence of, the executive branch.
 Congress has repeatedly found that if it has its own
 capabilities and people, members can get better deter-
 minations, analysis, support, models of legislation,
 drafts of legislation, tracking of bills, and monitoring of
 executive actions. Congress has moved increasingly in
 this direction in this century by establishing the Con-
 gressional Research Service, the General Accounting
 Office (GAO), the Office of Technology Assessment
 (OTA), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
 Although a latecomer, Congress has added extensive
 computer technology and technologists to its expert
 staff and library tools.
 The institutional arrangements of federal-
 ism have historically ensured a dispersion
 of power among levels of government. The
 distribution of computer technology
 throughout the federal system will reinforce
 rather than change this distribution.
 For example, Congress has added considerable com-
 puter modeling capability to its Congressional Budget
 Office (CBO) and committee staffs. In 1974, the profes-
 sional staff of the House Ways and Means Committee
 became concerned about evidence that the Nixon Ad-
 ministration had attempted to use the Internal Revenue
 Service for political purposes. Congress decided that it
 could no longer trust Treasury Department computer-
 ized models that enabled it to evaluate the possible con-
 sequences of new tax proposals. The Committee there-
 fore brought the model in-house and developed an
 independent ability to examine tax proposals through
 the same base data by the Treasury. 14 In 1976, in
 response to the Treasury's Office of Revenue Sharing
 having a computerized model, CBO developed the capa-
 bility to simulate the effects of different revenue sharing
 formulas on congressional districts, regions, states, and
 specific locales.'5 And today, CBO works with OMB
 and Treasury to insure that each uses the same base data
 and econometric models of the U.S. economy but
 develops independent economic forecasts.16 Although
 these examples illustrate that Congress has been largely
 reactive, getting the capability to use computers and
 models to equalize temporary imbalances of power bet-
 ween the executive and legislative branches, they also il-
 lustrate the inherent ability of Congress to restore the
 balance prescribed by the Constitution.
 Example 2. The executive branch tries to influence
 judicial review or overload the judicial branch with data
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 from its vast stores of computer databases. The
 judiciary is the least computerized of the three branches
 of government and so is considered most vulnerable to
 the information that the executive branch can amass in
 support of its legal and policy preferences. However,
 the Judiciary also has several powerful responses it can
 employ in legal proceedings. First, the Judiciary, by vir-
 tue of its tremendous power to grant or deny standing of
 parties and materiality of information, can declare all or
 part of the executive branch's information to be "non-
 information" and therefore inadmissible. In a profound
 sense, the Judiciary can define what information "is."
 Second, the Judiciary can require the executive to
 provide the information it wants, when it wants it, and
 in the form it wants it; and, the Judiciary can do so
 regardless of whether the information yet exists or what
 it costs the executive to get it. The Judiciary wields this
 power over all parties in litigation, as illustrated in the
 decade-long IBM antitrust suit. The Court would allow
 only a small portion of IBM's warehouse full of infor-
 mation to be admitted into evidence, while at the same
 time it felt free to require IBM to submit new informa-
 tion not readily at hand. Milton Wessel describes the
 situation as follows:'7
 The U.S. government's antitrust case against IBM had its tenth
 anniversary on January 16, 1979. At that point, "...the government
 had reviewed 60 million pages of IBM documents and IBM had in-
 spected 26 million pages of government documents. By its fourth an-
 niversary of actual court trial-on May 19, 1979, in addition to 1,309
 witness depositions, there were some 90,000 pages of trial transcript,
 with the end nowhere, even remotely, in sight. Then, on June 15,
 1979, the judge directed IBM to produce what it estimated to be an ad-
 ditional five billion documents, which IBM claimed would involve
 62,000 man-years of work and $1 billion production cost."
 Although IBM eventually won the case, company
 lawyers were generally unsuccessful in their attempts to
 influence what the Court would consider as evidence in
 the hearings.
 Third, where violations of federal law may be in-
 volved, the Court can overcome executive branch
 attempts to withhold information under claims of
 "executive privilege." The most dramatic example
 occurred during the Nixon Administration in the
 Supreme Court's order to the President to turn over the
 "Watergate tapes" to those investigating the incident.
 In summary, because of the Judiciary's powers over
 executive branch actions the vast banks of computers,
 huge databases, and sophisticated analytical models of
 the executive branch have little substantive effect on the
 balance of power between the executive branch and the
 Judiciary.
 Example 3. The legislative branch seeks to gain ad-
 vantage over the executive through the use of computers
 for oversight. Although computers had been used by the
 Congressional Research Service in support of Congress
 since the mid-1960s, computers first really came to Con-
 gress in the early 1970s with the creation of the House
 and Senate information systems offices. Since that time
 computerization has primarily focused on the day-to-
 day operations of Congress including writing and track-
 ing bills, tallying votes, publishing reports, paying staff,
 conducting research into social issues (through
 computer-based polling), and communicating with con-
 stituents.18
 Congress has developed a renewed interest in over-
 sight since the mid-1970s. This interest can be attributed
 to a post-Watergate disenchantment with executive
 power, the rise of a "new breed" of legislators, and the
 promise of computers to make comprehensive oversight
 feasible. Because of the computer revolution, many
 legislators and scholars believe that it is now possible to
 gather significant data about what really goes on within
 the bureaucracy. For example, Frantzich concludes that
 computer technology has "...put Congress in an
 enhanced power position relative to the executive
 branch."'19 With respect to oversight and budget review
 in particular he says:
 The Member Budget Information System (MBIS) provided by HIS
 [House Information Systems] allows the user to look at actual expen-
 ditures for previous years and get a feel for consistent patterns of
 surplus or deficit. The Program Review System developed by the
 Senate Computer Center takes the Office of Management and Budget
 tapes and identifies the line items for which each committee and sub-
 committee is responsible. This allows the committees to know exactly
 what they are responsible for very early in the process and less can be
 slipped by with little or no review. During the Budget process, the
 Comparative Statement of Budgetary Authority (CSBA) tracks the
 President's budget as it goes through Congress to provide a "snap-
 shot" of an appropriations bill at any given point in time. Each of
 these make the Congress better informed on its dealings with the ex-
 ecutive branch and thereby increases its relative POWER.20
 Frantzich also cites a study by Worthley which found
 that "legislatures with developed information systems
 do indeed function more influentially vis-a-vis the ex-
 ecutive and the bureaucracy."2'
 However, a recent study of computerized systems for
 legislative oversight in state governments by Miewald,
 Muller, and Sittig22 concluded that none of the leading
 states have the "ideal" information system for
 legislative oversight-a centralized, comprehensive,
 regularized process of administrative review based upon
 independent information. Moreover, the legislature's
 concern for oversight is limited, with individual
 legislators preferring to rely upon particularistic over-
 sight vital to their constituents and to good press (Frant-
 zich agrees). The legislature is not anxious to create an
 independent body of information because most
 legislative staffs find agency data to be reliable and
 meaningful and because they are interested in ensuring
 that legislative and executive information systems do
 not become incompatible. Finally, computer technology
 has not significantly changed the nature of legislative
 oversight or vice versa. Miewald and his colleagues in-
 dicate that budget review, which is the oldest form of
 oversight and the most heavily computerized, "...may
 be one more elegant toccata and fugue on incremen-
 talism." Thus, it seems that substantial power-
 enhancing effects of computer technology for legislative
 bodies remain in question.
 Even if an "ideal" computerized system for
 legislative oversight were in place, the executive
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 responses can be many. These range from stalling in the
 provision of information, to provision of misinforma-
 tion and disinformation, to outright refusal to provide
 information requested by Congress. But the most
 powerful response of the executive branch is the ability
 to present the President's viewpoint directly to the
 American people, thereby marshalling popular support
 and potentially nullifying the effects of oversight by
 Congress. Thus, we believe that computers are unlikely
 to produce power shifts from the executive to the
 legislative branch in this area either.
 Other examples of the interrelations of computers
 with the constitutional powers of the three branches of
 government are possible but not necessary. What is
 clear from the foregoing discussion is that as long as the
 branches are able to check one another, for example, by
 the Supreme Court deciding what is information and
 what is not, Congress granting or denying funds for ac-
 quisition of pieces of the computing package, or the
 President having a fireside chat with the American peo-
 ple to make a point on a given issue, no lasting power
 shifts will occur among the branches of government as a
 result of computers. However, temporary shifts in the
 balance of power could occur, as the foregoing exam-
 ples illustrate. Because such shifts are, often incremen-
 tal, subtle, and difficult to discern, the cumulative
 effects of many small changes could create an imbalance
 threatening to the constitutional separation of powers.
 Thus vigilance and systematic observation of computing
 use is needed.
 Computers and Intergovernmental Relations
 A number of scholars have pointed to the possibility
 that acquisition of vast computer databases gives the
 federal government exceptional power over states and
 localities or that clever state or local use of computing
 can do the reverse. For example, Benjamin says that:23
 ...the location in Washington of a preponderance of computer exper-
 tise and of resources to obtain the new technology and make it
 available, conditionally, to other levels of government may enhance
 already evident centralizing tendencies.... Federal incentives, if suf-
 ficiently large, may result in centralization of information networks in
 some policy areas, as in the case of law enforcement. State mandates
 may occasionally result in forced uniformity for local jurisdictions
 because of the technical requirements of statewide systems.
 This nationalization (or delocalization) of issues is
 somewhat more plausible than the interbranch power
 shifts above, since the U.S. Constitution does not spell
 out a clear relationship between the federal government
 and the states or localities. Federalism, or the balance of
 power between federal, state, and local governments,
 refer to the question of who shall define the goals,
 finance, and administer government programs and,
 ultimately, who shall monitor and conduct oversight of
 programs. According to Laudon, the last 50 years have
 demonstrated that federalism is evolving:24
 The specific balance of power between federal and state governments
 changed beginning in the 1930's with the development of the Social
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 Security Administration, and the initiation of federal responsibility
 for welfare and economic development programs. These early federal
 programs were administered by the federal government and only
 loosely articulated with state programs. By the early 1960's the rela-
 tionship between federal and state governments was characterized by
 some as a new "creative federalism." In this period the federal
 government rapidly expanded funding and program responsibility,
 while the states and localities were given day-to-day administrative
 responsibility. In the Reagan period, the pendulum has swung towards
 less federal government involvement, and a greater reliance on state
 and local governments.
 What, then, is the role of computer technology, and
 what is its likely effect on federalism? In general, we
 conclude that the technology will not concentrate power
 in the hands of one level of government over another.
 Whatever their evolution, the institutional ar-
 rangements of federalism have historically ensured a
 dispersion of power among levels of government. There
 is no reason to believe that this will change in the near
 future. Therefore, the distribution of computer
 technology throughout the federal system will reinforce
 rather than change this distribution. There are several
 reasons for this conclusion:
 The issue is not whether individuals are im-
 periled by a faceless government armed
 with computers but whether duly elected
 representatives, working through appro-
 priate constitutional mechanisms, will en-
 gender computer-dependent abuse of indi-
 vidual rights.
 First, the national government already has the
 supremacy of federal law on its side. It does not need
 computers to obtain what is already has. The states'
 powers are not coordinate with those of the federal
 government because the laws and treaties of the latter
 are, in the explicit words of the Constitution, "the
 supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or
 laws of any state to the contrary not withstanding."
 Moreover, the states are not independent of the national
 government nor it of them. The states have wide powers
 of autonomous action (i.e., the residue of powers not
 conferred by the Constitution upon the federal govern-
 ment), but not independence.
 Second, most intergovernmental relations do not in-
 volve the federal government "ordering" state and local
 governments to implement particular policies or pro-
 grams. Rather, they involve the federal government (1)
 paying for national programs such as unemployment
 and social welfare which are implemented by state or
 local governments, or (2) holding out carrots and sticks
 to induce state and local governments to adopt par-
 ticular policies or programs that the federal government
 would like to see implemented, but which it cannot or
 chooses not to order them to do. However, the careful
 use of computers could permit the federal government
 to be more heavy-handed in its superior role.
 For example, as part of a campaign to reduce fraud in
 federal welfare programs, the Reagan Administration is
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 requiring states to investigate the backgrounds of
 welfare applicants before adding them to federal benefit
 rolls. Under regulations published early in 1986, states
 must establish income verification programs by fall.
 The programs will enable social workers to check a
 welfare applicant's finances by examining state
 unemployment wage and benefit records, Social Secur-
 ity wage records, and some Internal Revenue Service
 records. Pete Earley argues that while technically the
 federal government cannot require a state to com-
 puterize its records, "the White House's Office of
 Management and Budget has written its income verifica-
 tion programs so stringently that it will be difficult and
 expensive for states to comply without using a com-
 puter. "25 Thus the Administration is not only requiring
 that states implement income verification programs but,
 indirectly, it also is requiring that they computerize
 them. When all 50 states have complied, the Ad-
 ministration will have created a defacto national social
 surveillance system through the states. What is in-
 teresting about this case is that the Administration is be-
 ing heavy-handed in its superior role. It is requiring
 states to implement "income verification programs";
 these programs enforce federal standards for welfare
 applicants. By requiring income verification, the
 Administration is also creating an information system
 which will enable it to assess state compliance with fed-
 eral standards. While this information system affects
 intergovernmental power relations only at the margins,
 it nevertheless enables federal agencies to better monitor
 state compliance with national standards.
 The issue is no longer what authorities can
 do but what they choose to do in surveil-
 lance of the population.
 Third, as the foregoing example illustrates, there
 could be a slow but significant shift over time toward
 the aggregation of federal government ability to ad-
 minister policies and programs at the state and local
 level more effectively than in the past. But the current
 trend is mostly in the opposite direction. It is con-
 ceivable that at some time in the future the federal
 presence in service delivery at the local level could be in-
 tensified. For example, improvements in data acquisi-
 tion at the local level, communication of those data up-
 ward to federal policy makers, and use of those data by
 policy makers in Washington with computer-aided
 models designed to identify deviations from federal
 norms could conceivably permit the federal government
 effective control of local program implementation.
 Laudon argues that this is already happening with law
 enforcement and perhaps social welfare.26 However, the
 dominant trend of federalism at present seems to be the
 opposite-toward more devolution of funding, ad-
 ministration, and oversight responsibility to state and
 local levels. Moreover, federal presence at the local level
 in the near future is unlikely; the bigger the federal
 government presence, the bigger target that presence
 becomes for growth-stoppers and budget cutters. It is
 likely that much of the explanation for state govern-
 ments' recent emergence as the fastest growing sector of
 government lies in their comparatively low profile
 among the citizenry who are busy watching Washington
 and City Hall.
 Computers and Relations Between Government
 and the People
 No area of speculation about the impact of computers
 on constitutional matters has received as much attention
 as the relationship between government and the people.
 The Constitution was designed by the Founding Fathers
 in large measure to protect citizens from government
 tyranny, thus the concern is basic. At issue is whether
 the use of computer technology will give government the
 power to overwhelm constitutional safeguards against
 abuse of individuals or groups. The question is pro-
 blematic because it requires a distinction between
 government as an entity and government as an agent of
 "the people." The Constitution clearly intends to pro-
 tect citizens from abuse by a monolithic government,
 and given the power limitations on the separate bran-
 ches and levels of government discussed above, com-
 puter use will not create a monolithic government.
 There is much greater ambiguity on the appropriate
 balance between the rights of individuals and the rights
 of a government that represents the will of the people.
 The issue is not whether individuals are imperiled by a
 faceless government armed with computers, but
 whether duly elected representatives, working through
 appropriate constitutional mechanisms, will engender
 computer-dependent abuse of individual rights.
 Most of the concern over this issue is expressed in the
 debate about computers, databanks, and personal
 privacy. A voluminous literature deals with the issue of
 privacy in its own right, and a sizable component deals
 with the impacts of computers and communications
 technologies on privacy.27 Much of the literature
 generates speculation and scenarios about the potential
 problems for privacy due to the computerization of
 government record-keeping activities. In contrast, there
 has been much less empirical evaluation of the privacy-
 related consequences of computerization.28 The debate
 has at times been intense spurred by concern that the
 building of databases containing personal information
 may be the first step toward the complete abolition of
 personal privacy.29 Of course, no one advocates
 building databanks for the purpose of reducing personal
 privacy, and therefore the counter-arguments to these
 concerns are essentially defenses of the status quo. The
 status quo, in turn, is continued discussion and modest
 legislative action aimed at privacy, on one hand, and
 continued construction and interconnection of com-
 puterized data bases containing personal information
 on the other.
 In the absence of widespread privacy invasions to cite
 as cause for immediate action, the alarms over com-
 puters and privacy issue are largely ideological. A
 cogent articulation of the ideological issue is provided
 by James Rule in his description of the "surveillance
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 potential" created by the establishment of large com-
 puterized databases of personal information on in-
 dividuals.30 With enough data and the right computer
 systems, authorities become able to monitor the
 behavior of large numbers of individuals in a systematic
 and ongoing fashion. Surveillance has always been
 possible, but it has been expensive. Technology makes it
 possible to monitor many people inexpensively, thus
 lowering the costs of surveillance that once imposed a
 natural limit on the government's ability to monitor in-
 dividuals. Lowering or eliminating that cost limit places
 the protection from unwarranted surveillance in the
 comparatively weak realm of law and policy. The issue
 is no longer what authorities can do, but what they
 choose to do in surveillance of the population. Rule and
 others argue that the establishment of systems with
 massive surveillance cannot be permitted because their
 potential for abuse is too great and the conventional
 legal constraints to contain abuses are insufficient to
 deal with this threat.31
 Again we ask whether the Constitution, as our most
 basic set of laws, is sufficient to counter the concerns
 raised by the computers and privacy issue? We believe it
 is, but not as an automatic matter. Privacy as a concept
 is not well established. Although privacy has played a
 key role in past issues of constitutional significance, in-
 cluding the highly controversial Roe v. Wade decision
 legalizing abortion, privacy is also a matter of continu-
 ing interpretation. For example, in the 1965 case of
 Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court defined the right of
 privacy as implicit in the Constitution and covering very
 personal conduct such as marriage and procreation. In
 the 1976 case of Paul v. Davis, the Court reaffirmed
 the individual's right to privacy but held that privacy
 did not extend beyond the bedroom, e.g., criminal
 justice agencies were not required to keep confidential
 matters that are recorded in official records. Most
 recently, in Howard v. Becker (1986), the Court took
 privacy away from the bedroom when it determined that
 consenting adults could be arrested for performing il-
 legal sexual acts. These cases also illustrate that
 although the Supreme Court is buffered from day-to-
 day political activity, it is influenced by the moods of
 the electorate. And although existing uses of com-
 puterized data banks have not yet abridged personal
 privacy sufficiently to require constitutional action or
 even substantial Supreme Court action on the matter,
 mass computer matching may yet require it. While con-
 stitutional remedies remain available for the time being,
 the privacy issue is being played out in the realms of
 rhetoric, legislation, and executive action.
 It is likely that the controversy will persist for two im-
 portant reasons. The first is the increasing creation and
 interconnection of large systems containing personal in-
 formation. Many large government information
 systems such as those of Social Security, the IRS, and
 the FBI contain sensitive personal information that can
 be used for social surveillance - tracking individuals or
 groups by linking data about them from such systems.
 Despite provisions made to limit the dissemination and
 use of data in these systems at the time they were
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 established, the interconnection of these systems is
 eroding these safeguards.
 The linkage of government information systems
 began in earnest as a response to rising crime rates in the
 mid-1960s, with efforts to interconnect criminal justice
 information systems at the local, state, and federal
levels. Now, despite the lack of evidence about the cost-
 effectiveness of interconnecting these systems, linkage
 among other systems is being expanded.32 Recently,
 concerns have arisen in response to both back-end and
 front-end computer "matching" of personal data
 across welfare, tax, and unemployment systems. For ex-
 ample, the Parent Locator system uses Social Security
 data to locate parents who are delinquent in child sup-
 port payments; similar systems are being implemented
 to locate individuals who have defaulted on student
 loans or defrauded welfare programs. In the name of in-
 come verification, systems for front-end matching of
 records are being proposed for "families whose children
 apply for low-interest college loans from the govern-
 ment, veterans who check in at VA hospitals, retired
 coal miners who request black lung benefits, and young
 families who ask the Farmers Home Loan Administra-
 tion for a mortgage.33 Such systems can greatly increase
 surveillance potential, and the creation of these in-
 tegrated systems is actively being pursued by the current
 Administration.34
 The second cause for continued controversy over the
 privacy issue is the weak enforcement of existing privacy
 legislation. Proponents of linking systems argue that
 legislative, and if necessary, constitutional remedies will
 be able to control abuse of such systems. But these
 remedies must be enforced and maintained. According
 to David Flaherty, who has studied privacy legislation
 and enforcement in many western countries, the en-
 forcement of privacy laws in the United States appears
 to be lacking in comparison to the situation in Canada,
 West Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom.35 The
 major national law, the Privacy Act of 1974, was never
 provided with either a Privacy Protection Commission
 (similar to the Civil Rights Commission) or a specific ex-
 ecu ive agency to see to its implementation. Instead,
 responsibility for oversight was handed to OMB and to
 Congress. Flaherty maintains that under the current Ad-
 ministration, OMB has stopped paying much attention
 to privacy or to the requirements of the Privacy Act.
 The 1974 law needs updating, but the Administration
 and Congress are preoccupied with other matters, and
 such a revision is not expected soon. Laudon and Earley
 point out the irony in the current situation where OMB,
 the primary executive agency for privacy oversight, has
 become the primary advocate for computer matching
 and national information systems, which in the name of
 governmental efficiency, pose serious threats to in-
 dividual privacy.36
 The federal government has not as yet established a
 single, comprehensive system facilitative of surveillance
 of the population. It has, however, increased the use of
 multiple national and state systems to track individuals
 to such an extent that it may be creating a de facto na-
 tional social surveillance system. This surveillance
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 potential created by linking government information
 systems, and the weak record of privacy law enforce-
 ment, warrants cause for continued concern and
 systematic study of the privacy issue. The privacy issue
 may yet warrant definitive Supreme Court rulings or
 perhaps even a constitutional amendment.
 The Constitution does not directly address what is
 possible in government/citizen interactions. Instead, it
 comments on what is and is not allowable. The amend-
 ment process permits the creation of constitutional
 amendments to accomplish desired goals. It would be
 possible, as Westin has suggested, to amend the Con-
 stitution to classify certain kinds of data as simply "un-
 touchable" for any use other than that for which they
 were collected. This would make questionable actions
 involving government use of personal data more dif-
 ficult to commit and much easier to challenge.
 Computers and the Political Process
 The Framers of the U.S. constitutional government
 took great pains to design a political system that worked
 well for encouraging freedom and constraining tyranny.
 But the Constitution is more than a road map for
 government function; it is an embodiment of specific
 and ongoing debates about the nature of democratic
 government and the means necessary to preserve it.
 Contemporary views of the Constitution are a product
 of the thoughts and writings of the Founding Fathers,
 coupled with past experience and the realities of the cur-
 rent era. As noted in previous sections, the vision of the
 Founding Fathers has stood a remarkable test of time,
 and technological advancements in information handl-
 ing do not appear as serious agents of change in the con-
 stitutional structure which that vision promulgated.
 There is a chance, however, that computer technology
 will have a substantial influence on political processes
 that lead to the election of representatives and the
 mobilization of national political movements. The
 Founding Fathers were careful about creating a stable
 government that would represent the will of the people
 and ensure the rights of citizens. But they could not
 foresee the changes in technology that would reshape
 the processes by which public opinion is formed and
 guided. Much has been written about the effects of com-
 munications media, particularly mass media of radio
 and television, on political contests.37 The addition of
 advanced forms of public opinion sensing and com-
 puterized direct-mail systems has created a package of
 tools that may transform the nature of the political
 process.
 At one level, these new means of conducting political
 races are immaterial. Competing political groups have
 always sought to avail themselves of the latest tools and
 technology, and they have been quick to imitate their
 competition's use of such tools. In a healthy pluralistic
 system, the equilibrium is quickly reestablished. But at a
 different level, there is concern that the extensive
 manipulation of public moods through the use of
 technology will decrease overall electorate awareness of
 the issues and increase the tendency toward the election
 of individuals on the grounds of media image and
 single-issue direct mail advertising. The ultimate con-
 cern is the deliverance of the role of political opinion
 making, and thereby the mobilization of political bias,
 into the hands of technicians who stand between actual
 political leaders and the electorate. This can result in
 reduced influence of the electorate over political leaders
 and, potentially, the means for wholesale distortion of
 the issues by political leaders with skilled "image-
 making" technocrats.38
 To a greater degree than with the issues discussed
 earlier, the impact of computers on political fund rais-
 ing and campaigning could prove to have significant ef-
 fects on the functioning of the constitutional system.
 This would not come about due to any particular
 weakness of the Constitution itself or as a result of
 changes in the structure of function of the governmental
 system. Instead, the changes would be part of larger ef-
 fects of automation on the mobilization of bias among
 interest groups in the population. The existing examples
 of application of computing to political campaigns are
 not terribly significant in their own right. Their in-
 cidence is small as yet, and though some credit the use
 of such systems to unexpected political upheavals, such
 uses have not jeopardized the two-party system or the
 electoral process. Nevertheless, the concept of constitu-
 tional democracy depends on an informed electorate,
 capable of discriminating among candidates based on
 their overall strengths. Neil Postman contends that ex-
 tensive use of television in campaigns has already
 decreased the quality of debate and reduced attention to
 the issues.39 Highly targeted, single-issue fund raising
 and campaigning conducted through computer-assisted
 direct mail or targeted telephone solicitation could con-
 tribute to such a trend. This is a speculative point, and
 experience with use of such systems has been insuffi-
 cient to determine their effects. Nevertheless, the poten-
 tial for significant change in the processes of constitu-
 tional government exist because the Constitution only
 specifies what the offices of government are, how they
 are to be filled, and who can be enfranchised to vote.
 The Constitution does not address the means by which
 campaigns should be conducted or the grounds on
 which voters should make electoral judgments.
 Although we cannot provide direct evidence of the ef-
 fect of computers on our political process, a highly in-
 structive lesson about our point can be drawn from the
 financial sector of the economy. In the past three years,
 major brokerage houses have invested millions of
 dollars in computerized securities trading analysis
 systems to help them capitalize on market movements.
 As the major institutional investors who control hun-
 dreds of millions of shares adopt such systems, some
 market watchers have begun to fear that they will force
 small investors from the marketplace, and more impor-
 tantly, turn an important capitalization mechanism into
 a form of gambling.40 Clearly, differences exist between
 the securities market and the country's political process,
 but the experience with computerized trading systems il-
 lustrates the power of computing technology to alter the
 behavior of complex social systems comprised of large
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 numbers of individual decision makers.
 Computers and the Constitution:
 A Relationship That Requires Vigilance
 Our overall conclusion is that computers have had
 very little effect on constitutional issues to date, but
 they might have considerable effect in the future. Rela-
 tions between the branches of the federal government
 supersede issues of computing and even, to a
 remarkable degree, issues of relative information ac-
 cess. Since no effective way exists for one branch to gain
 a sustained monopoly on information, the technology
 to handle it, the expertise to manipulate it, or the right
 to determine when it will be applied, the question of
 computer impacts on the separation and checks and
 balances of powers appears moot.
 Intergovernmental relations appear similarly unaf-
 fected by computerization. This is largely because the
 role that could be played by computer technology is
 subordinated to the existing constitutional definition of
 authorities and the political and practical nature of
 federal-state-local interactions. There is not much
 potential for computer technology to change this arena
 except at the margins.
 Relations between government and the people are a
 somewhat different matter. The potential for abusing
 individual right to privacy is substantial and rapidly
 growing as a direct result of computer-based
 surveillance and action. Computer matching and na-
 tional information systems are currently directed
 towards perpetrators of crime and fraud, but they could
 be directed more broadly. This potential for abuse poses
 a serious threat, especially given the instability of the
 privacy concept in the courts and the lackluster im-
 plementation, if not overturn, of the Privacy Act by the
 major U.S. monitoring agency. These conditions may
 require direct intervention by the Supreme Court, or
 possibly a constitutional amendment, to strengthen pro-
 tection against governmental abuse of information in
 aggrandizing power over individuals.
 Computer use can and probably will affect the
 political processes by which people are elected to public
 office. It is too early to tell what the actual effects will
 be. But since the Constitution itself addresses only the
 major offices and issues of enfranchisement, and not
 the protocols of party behavior or campaigning, it is
 possible that computing-based changes in the conduct
 of political contests will eventually have an effect on the
 ways the Constitution is interpreted and implemented.
 Our analysis suggests three reasons why computer
 technology has had relatively little effect on constitu-
 tional issues to date. First is the relatively insignificant
 role computing plays in such affairs. Computer
 technology is a powerful tool, but it is only one variable
 among many in the larger social and political processes
 of society. Also, the effects of computerization are not
 immediate and therefore are not immediately observed.
 Computers are introduced into organizations incremen-
 tally, and their effects evolve. Computing is a social
 movement that makes a slow and gradual passage
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 social, and cultural constraints. In the process, the tech-
 nology itself is shaped to fit the character of the adopt-
 ing organizations to a remarkable degree. Even when it
 appears that computer technology is having an effect,
 the effect can be difficult to pinpoint and measure.
 Second, computerization efforts do less than their
 promoters suggest they can under the best of cir-
 cumstances. A cursory reading of GAO reports over the
 last ten years readily shows that the history of executive
 branch computerization is replete with examples of
 poorly conceived systems, frequent implementation
 failures, and extraordinary cost overruns. While many
 proposed systems are technically feasible, others are
 not, and all of them turn out to be very, very expensive.
 These large costs tend to brake federal computerization
 efforts and certainly dampen whatever potential effects
 computerization might have on constitutional processes
 and functions.
 Third, aside from the technology itself, the very ob-
 jective of information management is political and will
 be treated politically. As Alan Westin has noted, "In-
 formation is a power resource that no one gives freely.
 We can set boundaries and control access in very, very
 effective ways."'41 Moreover, we can actually improve
 information control and responsibility in computerized
 systems more effectively than in manual ones. Most im-
 portantly, computers have not changed power distribu-
 tions within government, or within society more
 generally; if anything, they have reinforced existing
 power distributions.42 Even though the technology may
 be applicable to various purposes, which groups in
 society get to use a new technology and which social
 ends get served are preeminently political questions. The
 past high cost of computers and telecommunications
 restricted their availability to large, powerful organiza-
 tions such as government and business. Historically, in-
 formation technology has been shown to be a power-
 enhancing tool; its costs of production and operation
 have guaranteed that it would be used first by elites, and
 that elites would dominate its use for as long as
 beneficial.
 Some scholars suggest that the microcomputer could
 bring about a dramatic change in the traditional elitist
 domination of computing, thereby altering power rela-
 tionships among groups within society.43 They view the
 microcomputer as a power-distributing force in contrast
 to the mainframe computer which was largely a power-
 enhancing force. They suggest that microcomputers
 could be a major liberating force by democratizing com-
 puting access, information access, and decision in-
 fluence, thereby providing the possibility for individuals
 and small groups to make their mark too. They cite the
 growing use of personal computers for work at home,
 fo  professional and technical group communication,
 and for mass mail mobilizations on political and social
 issues as contributing elements and embryonic illustra-
 tions of the potential.
 While possible, we consider this scenario extremely
 unlikely for the reasons given in the foregoing analysis.
 In addition, recent research clearly indicates that
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 microcomputer use in organizations tends to follow the
 trends set by mainframe computing. Although the
 distribution of microcomputers encompasses more users
 than did mainframe technology, the proportionate
 distribution of microcomputer use among different
 groups within organizations is identical with that of
 mainframe use over the past two decades. Also
 microcomputer use in the home presently is dominated
 by middle-aged, high income, well-educated people in
 technical professions although students and the elderly
 are discernible minority users." However, microcom-
 puters have only begun to be deployed and networks
 that facilitate more horizontal information sharing have
 only begun to appear. It is possible, therefore, that these
 current tendencies towards reinforcement could evolve
 into other patterns that are power-distributing.
 The effects of computing on constitutional govern-
 ment clearly avoid popular, extreme characterizations
 of technological impact. They clearly do not suggest the
 demonic vision of George Orwell's 1984, in which
 technology permits malevolent autocrats to eliminate
 democratic government and individual freedom.45 They
 do not even approach the unpleasant but less horrific vi-
 sions of the mechanical society seen in Yevgeny
 Zamyatin's We, E.M. Forster's The Machine Stops, or
 Kurt Vonnegut's Player Piano. On the other hand, we
 do not see computers yielding the beatific vision of
 expanding freedom and democracy made possible
 through the beneficence of technological advancements
 that banish want and encourage understanding among
 people and nations.46
 In all, computer technology seems to be having a less
 decisive impact on constitutional government than these
 visions would suggest. Rather, the impact involves
 dynamic tension between what the technology makes
 possible and what the Constitution, the Amendments,
 the Courts, and our own experience tells us is wise. We
 have not been able, in this paper, to present the conten-
 tion, conflict, and compromise involved in balancing
 these interests. For purposes of exposition and argu-
 ment, we have treated these balances as historical fact.
 In reality, they are just the tally at the end of a day's
 trading in a political market; tomorrow is a new
 trading day. Consequently, we and most academic
 observers tend to have a cautious view of the potential
 changes, though generally it is a positive, incremental
 one.47
 There is a view of technology and its impact on social
 life that is orthogonal to this continuum, and that
 reflects another threat to our constitutional democracy.
 It encompasses the issues raised by the application of
 computing to mass surveillance, national information
 systems, and political campaigning; and, in particular,
 to the question of what is really important in the deter-
 mination of who should govern. This concern is
 manifest in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, in
 which technological advancements have been deliberate-
 ly, and to a large measure democratically, applied
 toward elimination of need and stabilization of the
 social order. The new world is the epitome of successful
 technocracy to the point where circumstances that give
 rise to jealously are preempted through ubiquitous use
 of technology. Technology is used not to give expression
 to our most malicious and destructive tendencies, but to
 our best-intentioned efforts to eliminate the causes of
 strife. In the process, it seems, the removal of strife has
 eliminated existential choice and thereby freedom.
 Technology has maximized efficiency in exchange for
 unavoidable limitations on individual privacy, choice,
 and freedom.
 The metaphor we find in the story is useful to our
 analysis of computers and constitutional government.
 The world depicted by Huxley evolved over a protracted
 period of time, and each step along the way posed a
 choice: live with the contradictions of the present or
 remove them with a technical solution. To the extent
 that American constitutional government is threatened
 by the application of information technology, the threat
 does not come from weaknesses in the Constitution or
 the government it shapes. Rather, the threat comes
 when the governed fail to protect and defend their rights
 to personal privacy and due processes. Whether the
 growing use of information technologies in mass social
 surveillance or in partisan political contests is leading to
 this end remains to be seen. However, this paper gives
 sufficient evidence to warrant renewed concern and in-
 creased monitoring of government computing activity.48
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